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11: Introduction:   
There is a presumption among practising economists and policy makers that national subsidies to
encourage clusters, while possibly in the national interest, are detrimental to world economic
efficiency.  To the extent that such policy simply causes a cluster to locate in one country rather than
another, policy is zero sum game.  It becomes negative sum if there is a ‘race to the bottom’,
distorting policy instruments away from cooperatively set levels.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether this presumption is well founded.  To do
this we analyse a world of many countries and two production sectors.  One sector is subject to
increasing returns to scale at the national level, arising because of a spatially concentrated
technological externality between producers.  As a consequence, this sector clusters in a subset of
available countries, even if all countries have identical underlying characteristics.  The first set of
issues we investigate are to do with the number and size of these clusters.  How do the number and
size of clusters at the equilibrium compare the world welfare maximising configuration of the
industry?  The second set of issues are to do with policy.  What are the incentives for the use of
active policy to attract a cluster, and what is the equilibrium of policy competition between
countries?  From the international point of view, should national industrial policy be encouraged or
constrained? 
The market failure in the model derives from an externality which creates increasing returns
to scale to national production.  The world welfare maximising number and size of clusters is
determined by a cost-benefit calculation comparing output from each cluster with output foregone
in the other sector of the economy.  In contrast, the equilibrium number is determined by private
agents deciding in which sector to work.  We assume that entry by coalitions of agents is possible,
so that there are no coordination failures encountered in establishing the industry in a country.
However, increasing returns are not fully internalised, as individual agents are free to enter and exit
the industry, making their calculation on the basis of private not social returns.  
We show that equilibrium produces too little of the increasing returns good, and does so in
clusters that are too small: depending on demand conditions, there may be too many or too few of
these clusters.  Turning to policy, we show that there is an incentive for governments to use policy
to attract or enlarge an industrial cluster.  However, in a central case, the Nash policy equilibrium
2between governments supports the world welfare maximum.  There is no ‘race to the bottom’, and
if some international authority were to cap subsidy rates this would lead to a proliferation of too
many too small clusters.  It is better to have relatively high subsidies, this increasing the size of
clusters, reducing the price of the good, and thereby removing the incentive for further countries to
try to acquire a cluster.
The analysis of this paper connects with two quite old strands of literature.  The basic model
we use is one of increasing returns (in one of two sectors) and price taking behaviour.  This is similar
to the modelling of increasing returns undertaken in trade theory in the late 1970s and early 1980s
(for example, Panagariya 1981 and Markusen and Melvin 1981).  However, these papers look at a
single small open economy or at trade between two countries, asking questions quite different from
those addressed in this paper.  Our policy analysis connects to results on city size in the urban
economics literature.  Henderson (1974), Vickrey (1977), and others show that entry of cities, each
controlled by a single large agent, leads to an efficient outcome.  While different in many aspects (eg
infinitely many potential city sites, spatially mobile labour, cities fully specialized each in a different
activity), these models share with ours the property that the Nash equilibrium of an entry game in
which decision takers maximise the total income of the city/ country supports world efficiency.1 
Throughout the paper we maintain the assumption that countries are small, and we look at
policy equilibrium between these countries  This is in contrast to the few policy papers that use ‘new
economic geography’ to analyse industrial policy.  Baldwin and Krugman (2000) and Kind et al
(2000) have a richer modelling of the micro-foundations of clustering than we have in this paper, but
focus on two countries, looking at policy to tax or to sustain an existing agglomeration.  We address
different questions, looking at the number of clusters that operate and the policy game between
countries that are seeking to develop clusters of, eg, high technology activity.  We regard the present
paper as setting out the simplest possible benchmark case, to which richer economic geography
modelling can later be added.
3ui ö v(p) ø mi   (1)
mi ö Y(L ÷ ni) ø pnia(ni) .   (2)
÷Kv ô(p) ö kna(n).   (3)
2.  Optimum and equilibrium: 
The model:
There are K countries, and country specific variables are subscripted i.  All countries have the same
underlying characteristics and are endowed with the same quantity, L, of a single factor of
production.  There are two sectors, y and x, both producing output that is freely traded;  y will be used
as numeraire, the price of x being denoted p.  Utility in country i is 
where mi is income, preferences are assumed quasi-linear, and v(p) is the indirect utility function for
good x.  Country i demand for good x is therefore  -v’(p).
Production of y takes place according to the production function Y(L - n), where L is labour
endowment, n is employment in the x-sector, and Y is increasing and strictly concave.  In the  x-sector
there are increasing returns, arising as workers create positive externalities for other workers.  This
is modelled by assuming that if n workers are active in the sector, then the average product of each
is a(n), increasing and concave in n.  The income of country i is therefore
In general, not all countries will be active in the x-sector, and we denote the number of x-active
countries by k.  If each of these countries employs n workers in x-production and the remaining K -
k countries specialise in y, then product market clearing is
World welfare maximisation:
We look first at the optimal arrangement of production in the world economy.  This amounts to
choosing the number of x-active countries, k, and the employment levels in each, n, to maximise
4W 2 Kv(p) ø (K ÷ k)Y(L) ø k Y(L ÷ n) ø pna(n) .
  (4)
Y ô(L ÷ n o) ö p o a(n o) ø n oa ô(n o)   (5)
Y(L) ö p on oa(n o) ø Y(L ÷ n o)   (6)
world welfare.  Welfare is simply the sum of all countries’ utilities,  
The first term is consumer surplus on x consumption, the second the income of countries with no x
production, and the third the income of the k countries with x-sector employment at level n.  Price
is determined by equation (3), although small changes in price have no effect on (4) as they are
simply transfer payments.
Choosing n and k to maximise W gives first order conditions:
where the superscript o refers to the fact that variables are taking their optimum values.2  The first
condition, (5), equates the value marginal products of labour in each sector.  The second, (6), says
that the number of x-active countries should be set so that income is the same in all countries,
implying that no income is gained by having another country start x-production.  Adding more x-
active countries would reduce the price of x, meaning that the value of extra x-output produced is less
than the y-output foregone.  We assume an interior solution with some countries active and others
inactive, i.e., that the solution of (3), (5) and (6) for no, po and ko has ko 3 (0, K).  Notice that,
eliminating po from (5) and (6), the welfare maximising value of no can be implicitly defined in terms
of technology alone.
Although the world welfare maximum equalises income across countries it does not equalise
the marginal product of labour, which is higher in x-active countries.  This means that – despite free
trade in goods – there would be further gains from international labour mobility to equate marginal
products across countries. 
5Y ô(L ÷ n e) ö p e a(n e) ,   (7)
÷ Y ôô(L ÷ n e) ö p ea ô(n e).   (8)
Equilibrium:
Either single workers or coalitions of workers are free to enter and exit the x-sector, although no
transfers are possible between workers in the x-sector and those in the y-sector.  The entry process
is best thought of as involving two stages.  At the first, a coalition of any size may enter; this
overcomes coordination failure problems associated with setting up increasing returns to scale
activities.  At the second stage individual workers may enter or leave the x-sector.  The coalition is
therefore unable to force workers to stay in the x-sector if they can do better by working in y.  These
assumptions ensure two things.  Mobility of individual workers at the second stage ensures that in
x-active countries each worker’s average value product in the x sector equals the marginal product
in the y-sector, i.e.
where the superscript e indicates equilibrium.  Entry by coalitions at the first stage means that there
exists no value of n (coalition of workers) at which there is unexploited profit from entry, pea(n) >
Y’(L - n).3  
This is illustrated in figure 1.  The horizontal axis (of length L) gives employment in each
sector, the curve Y’(L - n) is the marginal product schedule in the y-sector, and the curves pa(n) the
value average product schedules in the x-sector, drawn for different values of p.  The point marked
E is the equilibrium.  If fewer countries had an x-sector, then the price would be high and the upper
schedule, p’a(n), would apply.  However, it would then be profitable for a coalition of workers to
enter, this creating a new x-industry and driving the price down.  Equilibrium is at the tangency point,
where no further surplus can be extracted by x-sector workers: at any price lower than this workers
would quit the industry and work in the y-sector.  Formally then, equilibrium is characterised by (7)
and (8),
Using (7) in (8) to eliminate pe, gives an equation which is the first order condition for the
6minimization of average costs of x-sector production (where average costs are the wage divided by
output per worker, Y’(L - n)/a(n)); the equilibrium value of n depends just on technologies.
It is apparent from figure 1 that, in countries with x-production, the value of x-sector output
exceeds the value of y-sector output it displaces, since rectangle pea(ne)ne is larger than shaded area
.  This means that, at equilibrium, x-active countries have higherY(L) ÷ Y(L÷n e) ö P
L
L÷n e
Y ô(L ÷ z)dz
income and utility than do countries that specialize in y.  It is worth asking two questions about this;
what is it that makes this consistent with equilibrium, and what determines the magnitude of the
income loss?  On the first, an additional country entering the x-industry would see its workers
becoming better off since (even following a marginal reduction in p),  pa(n) > F’(L), the wage when
there is no x-industry.  However, once the x-industry exists and employs n workers, the wage rises
to F’(L-n), and workers then quit the x-sector to work in y, since pa(n) < F’(L-n).  Thus, it is inability
to force workers to stay in the x-sector that constrains the number of x-active countries and supports
the equilibrium.
The size of the income loss depends on the slope of the F’(L-n) schedule.  If this were
horizontal, then workers could be employed in the y-sector without encountering diminishing returns,
and there would be no income loss.  In our model F’(L-n) is diminishing, most naturally because of
the presence of a sector-specific factor in y-production.  It is worth stepping outside the model, and
asking what else would generate diminishing returns to y-sector employment.  One possibility is that
expansion of the y-sector encounters deteriorating terms of trade, as would occur if each country
produced a distinct variety of y-output.4  Then F’(L-n) would be replaced by the value marginal
product schedule, and downwards slope would come from price change even if the marginal physical
product were constant.  In addition, if there were non-tradeables then countries with no x-production
would have a larger non-tradeable sector, this being associated with lower non-tradeable prices and
diminishing marginal utility in non-tradeable consumption.
Comparison of equilibrium and optimum:
Figure 1 illustrates the equilibrium, and figure 2 is the analogous figure illustrating the optimum. 
At the optimum x-sector employment in each x-active country is at no, the point where the full value
marginal product in x-production (including the external effect) equals the marginal product in the
7y-sector (equation (5)).  The number of x-active countries has adjusted until the price is po, at which
the curve poa(n) is positioned so that the two shaded areas in the figure are of equal size.  At this
point no workers in the x-industry produce the same value of output (the rectangle nopoa(no)) as they
would employed in the y-industry, , ensuring that equation (6) holds.  Notice thatP
L
L÷n o
Y ô(L ÷ z)dz
for this to be true it must be the case that there is a range of values of n at which po[a(n)+na’(n)] >
Y’(L - n), creating the lens shape area containing point C. 
Comparing figures 1 and 2, it can be proved that if a(n) is concave and Y’(L - n) convex, then
po < pe, so that the curve poa(n) lies strictly below Y’(L - n), as illustrated (see appendix 1).  This
price inequality means that the optimum produces more x-output in total than does the equilibrium.
What about the employment level in each x-active country?  Since the optimum internalises the
externality, we would expect that the optimum level of employment in each cluster would be greater
than the equilibrium, so no > ne.  This is generally, but not necessarily, the case; the effect can be
reversed as the lower price at the optimum reduces the value of the externality.  Appendix 2 explores
this further and shows that sufficient conditions for no > ne are that Y’(L - n) is linear, or n is small.
What about the number of x-active countries, ko compared to ke?  In the neighbourhood of the
equilibrium it is certainly the case that a marginal increase in the number of x-active countries raises
world welfare, since x-active countries have higher income and utility than do countries that
specialize in y.  However, the full comparison of ko to ke can go either way; total output is lower at
the equilibrium, but so too is output per cluster (when  ne < no).  The outcome depends on, amongst
other things, the price elasticity of demand.  If the elasticity is low enough then the equilibrium will
have more clusters than the optimum, ke > ko; if the elasticity is very high then overall x-production
is low and it may be the case that ke < ko.  The case of an iso-elastic a(n) function and linear Y’(L -
n) is worked out explicitly in appendix 3, which shows that the equilibrium has clusters smaller than
the optimum (ne < no), and more clusters than the optimum, (ke > ko), if the demand elasticity is less
than some critical value which is greater than unity.  Thus, a possible case is illustrated in figure 3.
The four curves illustrated correspond to conditions (5) - (8), and incorporate the market clearing
price, solved through (3).  A world welfare contour is illustrated and it is clear that, in the
neighbourhood of equilibrium, a small increase in either n or k raises welfare.  Comparison of the
equilibrium with the optimum indicates that the equilibrium has too many and too small clusters, ke
8> ko,  ne < no.
Figure 4 gives a further way of illustrating outcomes.  The bold curve illustrated is the
production possibility frontier of a single country.  The price associated with the welfare maximum
is illustrated by the slope of the budget line, po.  Some countries specialise in y, and others produce
at point O (where the MRT equals the price po, i.e. equation (5) holds).  Indifference curves are
illustrated, and at the optimum all countries have utility level u o.  Comparison of levels of demand
and supply determines k, the number of x-active countries.  In the equilibrium countries either
specialise in y or produce at point E (which is on the production possibility frontier but at the point
given by equation (7)).  The price pe is higher, and we see that countries with x industry are on a
higher indifference curve (uk) than are those specializing in y (uK-k).
3.  International policy competition: 
We now turn to policy, looking briefly at the choice of action by a single country, and then turning
to the policy equilibrium that will arise if countries engage in simultaneous policy competition.  The
policy instrument we consider is an ad valorem subsidy on output in the manufacturing sector, with
subsidy factor denoted s, paid for out of a lump sum tax on the endowment.  
To see the effect of unilateral action, suppose that at the equilibrium one country that does
not have x-production introduces a subsidy, s > 1.  Potential producers in the x-sector in this country
are now faced with return spea(n) rather than pea(n), so entry becomes strictly profitable.  If no other
country uses the subsidy the price remains pe and some other country is forced out.5  The country
using the subsidy experiences a strict welfare gain, and the exiter a welfare loss.
This suggests modelling the policy game between countries.  We look for the Nash
equilibrium of a two stage game.  At the first stage governments choose a subsidy rate, and we will
see that generally some countries choose to use this subsidy, so have s > 1, while others will not,
leaving s = 1.  At the second stage the market equilibrium is established. 
To find the policy equilibrium, consider first a single country with x-production.  If a subsidy
s is in place, then employment in the sector is determined by equilibrium condition (7) which
becomes 
9Y ô(L ÷ n) ö spa(n)   (9)
s õ ö 1 ø n sa ô(n s) /a(n s),   (10)
p[a(n s) ø n sa ô(n s)] ö Y ô(L ÷ n s).   (11)
Y(L) ö p sn sa(n s) ø Y(L ÷ n s),   (12)
where p is the consumer price, (equation (3) is unchanged).  The country’s optimum policy is to set
s* to satisfy
ensuring that ns satisfies
This is the first order condition for maximisation of the income of an x-active country, (mi, equation
(2)).  Thus, for a given value of p, x-active countries set s to induce the size of the country’s x-
industry employment to go to the level that equates marginal value products in the two sectors.
Suppose now that countries have x-industry if and only if government uses the subsidy.  How
many countries will employ the subsidy (with s = s*), and how many not (with s = 1)?  Countries are
indifferent between having the industry or not when p has adjusted to level ps at which,
Notice that equations (11) and (12) are the first order conditions for a global welfare maximum
(equations (5) and (6)) and, with (3), they determine values of n, k, p.  This means that ns = no, ks =
ko, and ps = po.
Finally, we have to check that x-industry is active in countries that have the subsidy, and only
those countries.  This comes from inspection of figure 2.  In countries with the subsidy the x-sector
has average value product schedule s*poa(n) = po[a(n)+na’(n)], and since this lies above Y’(L - n)
over some range, entry is profitable.  Conversely, in countries where the subsidy is not in use the x-
sector faces poa(n) which lies below Y’(L - n) everywhere, so entry is not profitable.
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We summarise this in the following proposition.
Proposition:  A Nash policy equilibrium decentralises the world welfare maximum.  It has ks
countries setting s = s*, and the remaining K - k setting s = 1, with  ns, ks, ps determined by (3), (11)
and (12).
The fact that the Nash equilibrium in industrial subsidies decentralises the global welfare
maximum may seem surprising, and a few remarks are in order.  First, a single policy instrument
secures the optimal scale of the x-industry in each active country, and the optimal number of such
countries.  Attaining two targets with one instrument is not as surprising as it first seems, because
the instrument is set separately by each country and takes different values for countries that are active
and that are inactive in x-production.  Expressed differently, countries choose two instruments -- a
value of s and a probability of using it (= ks/K) and the equilibrium outlined above is the mixed
strategy equilibrium of this game in two policy instruments.  Second, the countries are assumed to
be small, so no country influences the terms of trade; this removes the prisoners’ dilemma aspect of
trade and industrial policy that might otherwise be expected.
International policy regulation:
It is often suggested that the presence of an internationally mobile x-industry, as modelled in this
paper, is conducive to a ‘race to the bottom’, with countries over-using subsidies in an attempt to
attract a cluster.  A proposed solution to the problem is international regulation to cap the levels of
subsidy that can be given.  This turns out to be a bad idea in this model, and it is quite instructive to
consider why.
The effect of a cap on the subsidy can be found by comparative statics on equations (9),
giving the effect of a given level of subsidy on employment; (12), the indifference condition for
countries to use the subsidy or not; and (3), supply and demand.  It is straightforward to show that
dn/ds > 0, and dp/ds & 0 if s & s*, with dp/ds = 0 if s = s*.  In the neighbourhood of s = s* it must also
be the case that dk/ds < 0, although globally the sign of this relationship depends on demand
elasticities.  These relationships are illustrated on figure 5, on which the lines n(sub) and k(sub) show
11
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the dependence of n and k on the subsidy rate, and come from solving equations (9) and (12) with
(3).  The optimal subsidy, s*, gives point O, and we see that constraining countries to use a lower
subsidy (i.e. moving along the horizontal axis to points s < s*) reduces x-industry employment in each
active country, this raising p and inducing more countries to offer the subsidy.  Thus, international
regulation to cap industrial subsidy rates would have the effect of reducing welfare as industrial
centres shrink in size but also proliferate in number.  Conversely, de-regulation (at s < s*) would
cause an increase in subsidy rates, causing countries to drop out of the industry.  Pareto
improvements would follow because as remaining centres expand prices fall.
For completeness, we also point out that a regime change occurs at a low value of the
subsidy.  If the subsidy is low enough it is not profitable for x-activity to become established even
in countries using the subsidy, so the number of x-active countries becomes less than the number of
countries offering the subsidy.  The dashed lines n(entry) and k(entry) are solutions to the subsidy
inclusive equilibrium conditions, 
Since government cannot force entry simply by offering a subsidy, the outcome is given by the lower
of the k(sub) and k(entry) curves and higher of the n(sub) and n(entry) curves.  Thus, points E at s
= 1 are simply the equilibrium of section 2.
Robustness:
In this model changes in one country affect others only via their effect on the price of x.  The
fundamental reason why the global optimum and the policy equilibrium are identical is that each
individual country is a price taker and there is no global benefit from a price change.  In this section
we make two minor extensions to the model that relax these conditions.
The first change is simply to assume that a country perceives that an increase in its subsidy
rate (and hence x-sector employment) will depress the world price of good x.  The second is to
suppose that there is a shadow premium on government revenue in each country.  This is an
additional distortion and it has the implication that, when subsidies are in place, a change in the price
12
m(p,n) ö Y(L ÷ n) ø pna(n) ÷ <n Y ô(L ÷ n) ÷ pa(n) .   (13)
0m(n,p)
0n
ø v ô(p) ø 0m(n,p)
0p
dp
dn
c
ö 0.
  (14)
Y(L) ö m(n,p),
  (15)
W 2 Kv(p) ø (K ÷ k)Y(L) ø km(n,p)
  (16)
of x is no longer just a transfer, but also has real income effects.  
Denoting the shadow premium on government funds used to support the x-industry by <, the
welfare of a single country with x-industry is v(p) + m(p,n), where m(p,n) is income net of the
additional cost of subsidy,
The final term is the premium on public funds times the cost of covering any gap between wages and
average value product in the x-sector (the term is square brackets is equal to (s - 1)pa(n)).  For
simplicity, let us control n directly rather than indirectly through s.  The first order condition for
national welfare maximisation is now
where  & 0 is the conjectured change in world price from an increase in one country’sdp/dn c
employment.  Countries are indifferent between having industry or not when
so the policy equilibrium is defined by (14) and (15), with (3).
Should there be a cap on the subsidy rate?  World welfare is
and totally differentiating this with respect to n and k gives,
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dW
dn
ö k 0m(n,p)
0n
ø Kv ô(p) ø k 0m(n,p)
0p
dp
dn
dW
dk
ö ÷ Y(L) ø m(n,p) ø Kv ô(p) ø k 0m(n,p)
0p
dp
dk
  (17)
v ô(p) ø 0m/0p ö v ô(p) ø (1ø <)na(n) > 0,
Kv ô(p) ø k0m/0p ö <kna(n) ' 0,
  (18)
dW
dn
ö ÷ k v ô(p) ø (1ø <)na(n) dp
dn
c
ø <kna(n) dp
dn
dW
dk
ö <kna(n) dp
dk
  (19)
We evaluate this at the policy equilibrium, where (14) and (15) hold.  We also note that, using (3)
with derivatives of (13), 
where the first inequality holds because x-active countries export x.  Equations (17) therefore
become, 
These expressions indicate first, that if < = 0 but  < 0, then there is a world welfare gain fromdp/dn c
an expansion of x-sector employment, dW/dn >0.  Thus, at the policy equilibrium, subsidies are too
low (from the point of view of world welfare) as countries perceive that an increase in the subsidy
rate will worsen their terms of trade.  Alternatively, if there is a premium on public funds, < > 0 (and
setting  = 0), then there is world welfare gain from capping the subsidy, so reducing n anddp/dn c
k, raising p and hence raising welfare.  The reason is that there is a strategic complementarity in the
subsidy game -- as one country raises its subsidy so the best response subsidy rates of other countries
increases -- combined now with a real cost of using the subsidy, due to the premium on public funds.
These extensions illustrate that adding extra distortions, through manipulation of the terms
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of trade or revenue constraints, can either weaken or strengthen the case for international policy
regulation.  However, they also illustrate the sense in which our basic model , and the consequent
efficiency of the policy equilibrium, captures a useful benchmark case. 
4.  Conclusions:
The paper examines the welfare economics of the simplest possible model in which the size and
number of clusters of industrial activity is endogenously determined.  In the absence of policy the
equilibrium output of the sector is less than the level that maximises world welfare, and the division
of this output between countries also differs from the world optimum.  At equilibrium clusters are
typically too small, and (unless demand is quite price elastic) there will be too many of them.  Real
income is higher in countries that have a cluster of activity than in countries that do not, and this
creates an incentive for subsidisation (or other active industrial policy) to attract a cluster.  Although
intuition might suggest that the subsidy is over-used as governments compete to have one of these
clusters in their country, this turns out to not be the case.  Competition for clusters will increase the
supply and reduce the price of the output of the sector.  Since clusters arise because of increasing
returns this is welfare increasing, and the paper shows that in an important central case the policy
equilibrium coincides with the world welfare maximum.  
15
HFGJ ö pa ô(n˜)ûn[n ø ûn]   (A1)
OEG & pûn a ô(n˜)ûn ø a ô(n ø ûn) [n ø ûn] /2   (A2)
HFGJ ÷ OEG ' pûn a ô(n˜)[n ø ûn/2] ÷ a ô(n ø ûn)[n ø ûn]/2 ' 0   (A3)
Appendix 1:
We want to prove that po < pe.  Suppose that p is the same at both, then in figure A1 the equilibrium
value of n is at E (equations (7) and (8)) and the optimum value of n is at O, (equation (5)), greater
by amount ûn.  We now show that, if Y’ is convex and a is concave, then the increase in pna(n)
between points E and O is greater than the decrease in Y(L - n), so that the equality required by
equation (6) cannot be satisfied.  To satisfy it requires that p is lower at O than at E. 
Changes are illustrated by areas in figure A1. Changes in both pna(n) and Y(L-n) share area
EGMQ, so we need to prove that area HFGJ is greater than area OEG.  Area HFGJ is,
where  is obtained by a mean value theorem.  If Y’ is convex, then area OEG satisfies, n˜
The right hand side of this is the area of the triangle shape bounding OEG.  In square brackets, the
firms term is the height FG, and the second is the vertical distance between the two curves, distance
OF.  Subtracting, 
Since a is concave and , this expression is positive, and strictly positive if the convexityn ø ûn ' n˜
of Y’ or concavity of a is strict anywhere in the interval n, n + ûn.
Appendix 2:
The equilibrium selects n in a manner that minimises a function, E(n), defined as
E(n) ö Y ô(L ÷ n) /a(n)
while the optimum minimises
O(n) ö Y(L) ÷ Y(L ÷ n) /na(n)
Combining these, we have
O(n) ö E(n) Y(L) ÷ Y(L ÷ n) /nY ô(L ÷ n)
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K ö 1, v ô(p) ö ÷ 0.3p ÷2, a(n) ö 0.2 ø n 0.2, Y(L÷n) ö (2 ÷ n)÷0.25.   (A4)
Y ö . ø 5(L ÷ n) ÷ 6(L ÷ n)2/2, Y ô ö 5 ÷ 6(L ÷ n), Y ôô ö ÷6.   (A5)
a(n) ö n 9, 9 3 (0, 1).  
Differentiating gives, with some rearrangement
O ô(n) ö E ô(n) Y(L) ÷ Y(L÷n)
nY ô(L÷n)
ø
E(n)
n
1 ÷ Y(L) ÷ Y(L÷n)
nY ô(L÷n)
1 ÷ nY
ôô(L÷n)
Y ô(L÷n)
If both O(n) and E(n) have a unique minimum, then the minimum of O(n) will be at a higher value
of n than the minimum of E(n) if 0’(n) < 0 at E’(n) = 0.  Defining A(n) as,
A(n) ö 1 ÷ Y(L) ÷ Y(L÷n)
nY ô(L÷n)
1 ÷ nY
ôô(L÷n)
Y ô(L÷n)
We want to prove that A(n) < 0 at the equilibrium point.  Using a third order Taylor’s expansion for
Y(L) - Y(L - n) (where  makes the expansion exact), givesn˜
A(n) ö nY
ôô(L÷n)
2Y ô(L÷n)
1 ø nY
ôô(L÷n)
2Y ô(L÷n)
÷
n 2Y ôôô(L÷ n˜)
6Y ô(L÷n)
1 ÷ nY
ôô(L÷n)
2Y ô(L÷n)
This is negative if Y(L - n) takes the quadratic form given in (A5) below, or if n is small.
Appendix 3: Examples
The figures of the text are produced using the following functional forms:
Closed form solutions can be derived for the following example.  Let y production be given by,
so the marginal product schedule is linear.  x- production is,
Eliminating p by taking the ratio of equations (5) and (6), 
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Y(L) ÷ Y(L ÷ n) /Y ô(L ÷ n) ö na(n) / a(n) ø na ô(n) ,
n o ö 29(5 ÷ 6L) /6(1 ÷ 9). (A6)  
÷ Y ô(L ÷ n) /Y ôô(L ÷ n) ö a(n) /a ô(n),  
n e ö 9(5 ÷ 6L) /6(1 ÷ 9).   (A7)
p ö n 9ø1k/K ÷1/8.  
5 ÷ 6(L ÷ n o) ö (1 ø 9) k o/K ÷1/8n o 9÷ (9ø1)/8 (A8)
k o ö 6K
29
1 ÷ 9
5 ÷ 6L
2
.
5 ÷ 6(L ÷ n e) ö k e /K ÷1/8 n e 9÷ (9ø1)/8 (A9) 
k e ö 6K
9
1 ÷ 9
5 ÷ 6L
2
.
from which the welfare maximising value no can be derived as
Eliminating p by taking the ratio of equations (7) and (8), 
from which the equilibrium value ne can be derived as
Thus the number of employees in each cluster at the optimum is ½ the number at the equilibrium.
Now let world demand for x-output be  p-8, so that equation (3) is,
Equation (5) then becomes
If 8 = 1, this gives,
Similarly, equation (7) then becomes
If 8 = 1, this gives,
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1.  For a good modern statement of this see Becker and Henderson (2000). The fact that at the
optimum city land rents should be transferred to the increasing returns activity has given rise to the
label ‘Henry George’ theorems for these results.
2.  The second order condition is clear from figure 2, discussed below.  On this figure the curves
 and   intersect twice.  The second order condition is that the maximumY ô(L ÷ n) p a(n) ø na ô(n)
is the upper intersection.
3.  There cannot be a situation in which pea(ne) < Y’(L - ne) as the coalition knows that workers
would leave at the second stage.
4.  An ‘Armington’ structure of y-sector demand.
5.  There is a continuum of countries, so this discussion is more accurately phrased as a measure of
countries introducing the subsidy, and a measure exiting.
5 ÷ 6(L÷n o)
5 ÷ 6(L÷n e)
ö (1 ø 9) n
o
n e
9÷ (9ø1)/8
 
8 ö (1 ø 9) /9.
  (A10)
Thus, the equilibrium number of x-active countries is twice the optimum number, ke = 2ko.  The
equilibrium total quantity of output is 2(½)9+1 = 2 - 9 times that at the optimum and the price is 2  9
times higher.  Under what conditions is ke > ko ?  Taking the ratio of (A8) to (A9) with ke = ko gives
which, using (A6) and (A7) can be shown to hold when
Thus, there are too many clusters, ke > ko , providing 8 < (1 + 9)/9, (including 8 = 1).  Only if demand
is more elastic than this will we have  ke < ko ; in this case the higher equilibrium price chokes off
quantity sufficiently that a smaller number of countries are x-active.
Endnotes:
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